The first British geneticists framed the productive value of their work against national, international and colonial contexts. They drew on traditional links between nation, wheat and civilisation, promising rural stability and national security if only they could command the resources required to create new, agriculturally useful, varieties. Framing their new science in this manner allowed them to make claims on the public purse far beyond those of the normal patent bargain. With these funds they set about establishing new research institutes across the country and the globe. This paper follows the work of one of the most prominent early geneticists, Rowland Biffen, as he established new research centres in Britain and sought to export the same model of development to Kenya. In support of these activities, a public-service-2 ethos view of Biffen's work appeared in the non-specialist press of the day. This public-service view of his work was one which aided Biffen's efforts to nationalise financial support for his new plant breeding program.
2 ethos view of Biffen's work appeared in the non-specialist press of the day. This public-service view of his work was one which aided Biffen's efforts to nationalise financial support for his new plant breeding program.
Introduction
As a matter of fact you are producing more than in the Argentine ... Given proper cultivation ... I can see no great difficulty in Kenya producing not only enough to feed itself, but to feed its native population as well. 1 This was the somewhat surprising conclusion reached by Sir Rowland Biffen in his 1927 address to the white farming community of Kenya. One can imagine the farmers' surprise at being told their country produced wheat on a level with Argentina -one of the great wheat producing countries of the period. Our own surprise today 3 may relate more to the attitude expressed by Biffen towards the "native population". However, the partially redeeming specifier that is missing from this quotation is wheat. At the time of Biffen's speech, wheat was a new crop in Kenya. 2 The staple crop of most Kenyans was maize. It was part of Biffen's plan for the country's agriculture that an internal market for wheat consumption -one which included the "native population" -should stimulate the development of a wheat industry. The relationship between wheat and colonial development would, he hoped, be a symbiotic one. As settlers spread European culture, including novel concepts of land ownership and agricultural production, the increasingly civilised native population, so the thinking ran, would turn to eating wheat, thereby supporting the settlers' efforts at introducing the crop to the country. This pattern of development, now long forgotten, would have been familiar to Biffen's audience. 3 It turned on the belief that civilisation was deeply associated with a preference for wheaten, and ideally, white bread. 4 What is more, eating more wheat could raise a nation up from barbarity. Producing wheat in nation-sustaining quantities demanded that hunter-gatherer and foraging systems be replaced by high farming, preferably just like that conducted in the south east of Britain. Developing Kenya's agricultural land also meant civilising the population.
Wheat was the key to both ambitions.
Biffen's belief in the civilising power of a thriving wheat industry was not restricted to recently acquired colonial outposts. In Britain too, Biffen believed the application of Mendelian science to wheat growing problems could deliver a thriving industry --one that would undergird a stable and prosperous rural civilisation. To put this claim in language already introduced in this volume, Biffen made productivity claims about Mendelism's ability to deliver a new rural civilisation, at home and abroad. This outcome was important enough, Biffen felt, to warrant government 4 funding. Looking back on these historical developments, one can see in operation a quite different conception of the "patent bargain" to that discussed so far in this volume. Conventionally, the patent bargain is a deal between the state and the inventor in which the state rewards an inventor's disclosure of a new invention with a limited monopoly over its sale. Biffen, who very much believed that Mendelism allowed him to invent new plants, felt that, rather than deserving a government mandated monopoly over his innovations in return for their disclosure, his work, instead, required direct government sponsorship. In other words, the national importance of the productivity claim Biffen made for Mendelism was, by his lights, and those of his many supporters, enough to justify direct government support that went far beyond the limited protection that patents might offer.
As we have already seen (in the survey paper earlier in this issue), during the nineteenth century the intangible value of new varieties came to be gauged through an intricate system of prize giving and public display. 5 Biffen and his supporters became adept at making productivity claims for their Mendelian varieties in this context.
Biffen's new varieties of wheat were displayed in public more often than most and these public appearances form the evidential base of this paper. The paper's first half focuses on Biffen's plans for the British wheat industry, especially the international dimensions of these plans. First, we will see that the international grain trade was the source of many problems for the British wheat industry. This was a new vision for the British Empire, one in which Britain would be situated at the heart of a colonial network of agricultural production that fed back to the centre.
In the early 1920s, far from waning, many were expecting the British Empire to expand. In 1927, during a visit to Kenya, Biffen outlined his plan for the country's infant wheat industry. These plans reveal his ambitions to entirely nationalise the innovation process, from agricultural research station to farm field, and, in so doing, to stabilise the rural civilisations of both Britain and Kenya. Mendelian wheat breeding in Britain was truly an international affair upon which, Biffen felt, the stability of rural civilisation hinged.
Wheat Breeding: A Matter of National Importance

The Grain Invasion
During the 1890s the British wheat industry was severely depressed. 6 The total number of acres devoted to wheat growing was in decline, from well over three million acres in the heyday of the agricultural boom of the 1860s to below two million and falling in the late 1890s. Many farmers were turning wheat fields over to pasture, following the farmers' dictum for hard times, "down corn: up horn". When the price of corn was down, it was a good time to move over to cattle, either for meat or dairy.
The decline in home grown wheat meant hard times for inland millers who increasingly had to pay transport costs to get imported wheat from the ports. There were also more subtle effects on rural life. As harvests became smaller, fewer workers 6 were needed and this added to the on-going trend of rural depopulation, as many casual labourers left to find jobs in the expanding cities. These changes threatened a certain view of agrarian civilisation encapsulated in the phrase "high farming". Wheat farming was decidedly high farming; cattle, dairy and mixed farming were considered lowly activities in comparison. The location of high farming, in the south east,
indicates where a great deal of this prejudice comes from: high farming was practised by the wheat barons and wealthy land owners of this area; animal farming took place in the provinces. 7 In the 1890s, it was high farming that was in crisis; mixed and dairy farming, however, were doing reasonably well. Arable land that had been turned over to pasture was increasingly used to produce milk for London. 8 The area of land used for wheat production continued to shrink into the start of the twentieth century. The problem was one of foreign competition. The westward expansion of wheat growing in the US and Canada had led to a massive increase in wheat production, and surpluses were placed on the international grain markets.
Improvements in storage and transport meant that American and Canadian farmers were now directly competing with their British counterparts. 9 British farmers were at a disadvantage on two fronts. First, New World wheat, grown on the fertile prairies was cheaper to produce, especially given high labour costs in Britain. Secondly, this prairie wheat was imbued with a character called "strength", that was absent from British wheat. Essentially, this was the character that millers and bakers believed to be responsible for making a loaf fluffy and voluminous. At that time, fluffy white bread was rapidly becoming more popular than the traditional brown loaf. In line with this change in preference, strength had become the defining feature of a wheat variety's quality. American and Canadian wheat had more of this strength than British wheat, leading British millers and bakers to use more imported wheat, for which they paid 7 higher prices in a market which had been generally driven downwards. 10 The grain invasion (as the massive, late nineteenth-century increase in imports of grain has since been called) had two effects on British agriculture: the first was to undermine the price of weak British wheat; the second was further to concentrate the milling industry around the big ports. 11 Together these two effects were draining life away from inland rural areas, as inland millers and wheat farmers were being driven out of business. 
Journal of the Royal Agricultural Society:
The extraordinary certainty with which the complex problems of heredity can be unravelled has shown that the hopes of a few years ago, that breeding
would become a precise subject, are rapidly being realised.
19
There is a beautiful paradox here: disease resistance is actually, as we now know, much more complicated than this. 20 Biffen, the economic significance of this work was, at this point, a secondary bonus.
The primary conclusion that he, along with Bateson, derived from these early diseaseresistance experiments was that Mendelism could explain a wider range of characters in a wider range of organisms than had previously been recognised. 25 Nonetheless, Biffen's disease-resistant Little Joss was a celebrated victory.
News of the variety was carried by The Times and Daily Mail as well as by a number of local newspapers. 26 Biffen also did a great deal to promote his views to farmers, and he made many personal appearances at the meetings of farmers' clubs.
Sometimes the discussion at these events would become heated as farmers wanted to know what Biffen could do for them in terms of addressing what they considered to be the more serious problems they faced. 27 However, there was often someone in the audience who was more than willing to step forward and defend This impassioned defence of Biffen and his work is significant for the grounds on which Laxton based it (and also because it speaks with such conviction to a promise that was, at that point, still unfulfilled: the economic success of Biffen's varieties).
Laxton's claim that Biffen had no commercial interest fits with a general pattern of claiming selfless public service as a motivation, one which has already been noted as an important feature of Biffen's interaction with the moral economy of plant breeding.
Here, Laxton went one step further, claiming Biffen's financial disinterest was guaranteed, not only because of his moral character, but also by his scientific credentials. In other words, Biffen's conception of the relationship between science and agriculture was not only more likely to yield results, but it also guaranteed the degree to which farmers could trust him.
In 1910, Biffen and his colleagues at the newly upgraded School of Agriculture at the University of Cambridge petitioned the government, through their contacts at the Board of Agriculture, to extend funding for Biffen's work by establishing a plant breeding institute. 29 After some negotiation, the new institute was housed on the farm next door to the School's, and Biffen was made its first Director. From this new institutional position Biffen continued his work on strength.
The Times frequently published news of Biffen's work, and, in 1914 , as the probable onset of war focused minds on the question of food supply, Biffen authored an account of his work as part of a special focus section on the wheat industry. He explained that the wheat plant had reached its yielding limit-higher yields could only be achieved by better cultivation-and consequently the only way to increase prices, and so the relative level of home production, was to increase the quality of British wheat. The prospects of doing so were, however, good:
The results described show that in practice it has proved possible to add something to the quality and yield of wheats grown here. The experimental results are still more promising, and we can reasonably expect, especially now that the rate of consumption is again catching up the supply, that increasing profits will lead to an increase in our English wheat area.
31
In this line of research, instead of seeking to avert losses, Biffen, using Mendelian theory, set about producing a new wheat variety that would increase farmers' profits directly by protecting them from foreign imports. 
The Other Grain Invasion
Mendelism was embedded in an international context, one rarely acknowledged in the nation-specific histories of genetics currently available. 40 Biffen's strains of wheat were constructed using materials from around the world. The Daily Mail described this network explicitly, in the 1930s, in a piece celebrating some of Biffen's achievements:
From the Cambridge station wide-spread research is directed. One research worker is testing rust-proof varieties from Canada in order to see whether they will be susceptible to the yellow form. In the Argentine, in Australia, in Kenya Colony, and in Germany Cambridge students are conducting experiments for the man who guided their studies in the earlier days; indeed there is no part of the world in which people anxious to carry out research cannot receive direction and inquiry from the experimental station. 46 In terms of Biffen's plans for British agriculture, the rest of the world was a mixed blessing. On the one hand, the grain invasion represented a threat to British wheat farmers, unable to compete on costs or quality with foreign imports and this was a problem against which Biffen framed the productive value of his work. On the other hand, Biffen's research depended on his access to varieties of wheat which possessed the characters he wanted to use in his breeding programs. The position of Britain's colonies adds an interesting layer of complexity to this picture, not least because the resources available in the colonies suggested a way forward for ensuring Britain's food security and placing the country at the heart of a new golden age of colonial prosperity.
The Agricultural Empire
British Colonial Agriculture and the International Wheat Markets
If we return to Biffen's interview with Harold Begbie, we see that it ended with an appeal to the lost greatness of Britain, a greatness that, Biffen believed, could be recaptured through the sort of revolution in plant breeding he advocated. Yet, considering Biffen's emphasis on the importance of science and progress, the image 19 he presented is a curiously backward-looking one, seeking, as it did, to capture and restore something of a supposed lost greatness: 47 London, says our professor, is still the world's chief emporium of the seed trade; very few people know that fact, an important fact; and yet nothing is done on a scale commensurate with this position to improve the quality of our seed. Sweden is far more go-ahead than we are. We ought to wake up to the duty laid upon us by our position as the centre of the greatest agricultural empire in the world. We can give a new impetus to the national life, establish a new stability, if only we give our minds to the business.
48
In other words, Biffen believed that what the country needed to create a new social stability was a revolution in agriculture, one that would change agriculture in both Britain and the colonies.
In 1918, at around the time he was interviewed by Begbie, Biffen also appeared as star witness before one of the government's post-war reconstruction committees. The Selborne Commission was instigated by the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries under the terms, "To consider and report on the methods of effecting an increase in the home production of food supplies, having regard to the need of such an increase in the interests of national security." 49 The Commission recommended the adoption of surprisingly far reaching powers for the government to intervene in British farmers' fields, if it was deemed that land was being wastefully used for "game or games". Despite this very national focus, Biffen's evidence rested largely on a summary of global wheat production. Britain's problem, Biffen explained, was the US and Canadian imports that had flooded the market. He proceeded to give a 20 summary of wheat growing in Argentina, Russia, India and Australia, all countries which provided sources of cheap wheat. Cheap wheat had driven down prices and with it the acreage farmers were willing to use for wheat growing. However, there was, Biffen reckoned, some hope that the situation would soon change:
It may be assumed that the course of events in America will prove typical of that of other countries where there has been a rapid rise of production under prairie conditions. The soils gradually become exhausted and in place of continuous wheat cultivation a system of rotation has to be adopted.
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In other words, the grain invasion would soon dry up and consumption would once again outstrip global production. Aside from waiting out the storm, Britain's best hopes for rejuvenating its wheat growing industry lay in three directions, improved varieties, more intensive production and an increase in the wheat growing area. Of these options, Biffen was most hopeful about the first, improved wheat varieties:
Increased production may be expected from any improvement in the kinds of wheat grown. … of late the systematic study of cross-breeding has opened up great possibilities of improvement.
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Of course, if improved wheat varieties could aid British agriculture, they could also do the same in the colonies. Establishing agriculture (and favourable trade links) in the colonies would, Biffen hoped, increase Britain's food security. Cotton from Egypt, wheat from India, and rubber and sugar from the West Indies were already 21 established crops which could be tuned up. For Kenya the plans of the new agriculturalists were somewhat more ambitious.
Sir Rowland Biffen in Kenya
Colonies such as Kenya had virgin soils, which for one reason or another had never been used for wheat production on a large scale. It was hoped by many, both in Kenya and Britain, that wheat could be introduced alongside the plantation crops of coffee and sisal and the staple food crop of maize. As we shall see in this section, Biffen was at the forefront of the campaign to establish wheat growing in Kenya in the belief that a similar institutional empire to his own in Britain could be established in the colony and similar dreams of rural civilisation and stability realised.
Biffen's involvement with the British empire endured throughout his career.
His star student and obituarist, Frank Engledow claims that Biffen became an agricultural scientist after an inspiring research trip to study colonial agriculture in the West Indies. 52 Even after Biffen had officially retired from academic life, for many years he remained involved with the Imperial Agriculture Bureau. His second trip to the colonies, this time as a knight of the realm rather than an awed student, was to Kenya in 1926. He had been asked by the colonial administration to investigate the colony's prospects of establishing wheat farming; it was something its European settlers had been calling for, for some time. 53 The problems in Kenya which Biffen recorded were quite different to those in Britain. Biffen's remit was to assess claims by Kenyan settlers that wheat could be grown productively. It seems that some farmers did very well with wheat crops, but overall there were two problems, one geographical and one pathological. The topographical map of Kenya (reproduced in figure 1 ) shows the geographical situation 22 that would-be wheat farmers had to deal with. Kenya can loosely be divided into two areas, a fertile mountainous region (in the west), and a large area of low lying and drought-prone land that was less suitable for wheat growing (in the east). Much of the interest in growing wheat in the mountainous area that was suitable for the plant had arisen since the 1910s, when a new railway line was brought to this region, making access far easier.
[insert figure 1 here]
Beyond these geographical constraints, there were pathological hurdles facing Kenyan wheat production. Kenya was home to three types of rust disease. Losses from these rusts could be catastrophic, ruining a whole crop if they took hold. The three varieties, black rust, Puccinia grammis, yellow rust, Puccinia glumarum, and brown rust, Puccinia triticina, were active at different altitudes. Black rust, the most destructive, was prevalent at 4,500 -6,500 feet, yellow rust was restricted above 6,500 feet, and brown rust grew at any altitude. 54 A simple solution to the yellow rust problem along the lines Biffen had instigated in Britain with Little Joss would not be enough to overcome a three-way pathogenic threat.
Despite the problems facing Kenyan wheat farmers, Biffen was hopeful. In his speech to the Kenyan farmers in 1927, Biffen claimed that the only way to progress was by increasing support for Kenyan research stations, similar to his own in Britain.
Granted such support, the prospects would be better. At the end of his trip, Biffen published the results of his observations and his recommendations in a report produced by the Kenyan administration. This forty-page booklet begins with a general survey of extant attempts at wheat growing. The area on which wheat was cultivated 23 had been steadily expanding. Biffen attributed this to access provided by the new railway line and the breaking of new, fertile land in the process. Demand for wheat, Biffen supposed, was also increasing as the "native population is beginning to make use of wheaten food-stuffs." 55 Increases in local demand, he reckoned, could only benefit the white settlers who tried wheat farming.
In accordance with the terms on which he had been invited to Kenya, that is, to report on the wheat industry "with particular reference to the methods of plant breeding now in progress and the organisation of an extended service in the future", Biffen's recommendations were heavily in favour of extending the institutional basis of plant breeding. 56 His first recommendation was the creation of a permanent post of government plant breeder. This position had only been occupied on a temporary basis in previous years and, while there had been some success, in order to expand this work Biffen believed there should be someone working in the post continuously and preferably aided by an assistant.
Biffen saw the other key to answering Kenya's problems-with the three different types of rust-in changing the situations of the research stations at which plant breeding was conducted. At the time, Kenya had three plant breeding research stations: Scott Agricultural Laboratories, just outside Nairobi, and two others, one at Njoro and one at Gilgil. Biffen recommended that the centre of plant breeding activity should be moved from its current position in Nairobi to the Njoro station, which was situated at around 7,000 feet. This altitude would allow researchers to investigate resistance to all three varieties simultaneously. 
Concluding Reflections
The story of the expansion of Biffen's institutional empire in Britain is now quite well known. What has been shown here for the first time is the extent to which Biffen's work became a feature in the popular press. The support offered by The Times, the Daily Mail and other newspapers must have aided Biffen in his negotiations with civil servants and university staff over access to space and resources. This is the nub of the IP issue at hand in this paper. Whether Mendelism was successful or not, it was
Biffen's productivity claims made-using the machinery of promotion of an earlier generation of plant breeders-on the behalf of Mendelism which mattered. Biffen might not have taken out any patents on his new varieties but he certainly traded on this item of socially constructed intellectual property, the belief (as espoused by 25 Laxton) that Mendelism could and soon would be used productively. Biffen's motivation was ostensibly the good of the nation but his mode of action shares more than a passing resemblance with that of the traditional inventor, demanding some form of favouritism because of the promises his new invention, once revealed, held out for national wellbeing.
Recognising the popular, contemporary Mendelism-will-revolutionise-plantbreeding narrative need not stop us, however, from asking how much Mendelism actually mattered in Biffen's breeding programmes. Indeed, Engledow and Bateson have already answered this question to some extent: in their view, Biffen was more of an artist than his popular presentation would suggest (although Biffen's often repeated moniker of 'Wheat Wizard' hints at this). However, being distracted overly by such questions detracts somewhat from the solidity of Biffen's and his supporters' plans.
Whatever role Mendelism might actually have played in the development of plant breeding, its perceived role was far more important for Biffen's wider aspirations.
Plant breeding was important to Biffen, but it was part of a grander scheme for changing the whole system of agricultural production.
Mendelism was deployed as a national science that would place Britain on a better global footing in terms of its food security. Biffen's claim that it could rescue the British wheat industry from international competition was an oft-repeated article of faith in the corridors of the Ministry of Agriculture. Mendelism was also deployed as a science of empire and this can be seen in Biffen's claims that it could revolutionise agriculture in the colonies, the agricultural empire. This paper has made it clear that Mendelism operated on an international level, responding to international threats but also drawing on international resources, which were sent back to Britain by [CC-BY-SA-3.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0) or GFDL (http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/fdl.html)], via Wikimedia Commons.
